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CASE COMMENTS
AimALS-OWNEn OF RABD DOG LiABrz FOR DAMAGE TO S EP
Defendant was the owner of a dog which became diseased with rabies,
and attacked the plaintiff's flock of sheep, -biting them and transmit-
ting to them the disease from which they afterwards died. Held, de-
fendant was liable. Mastin v. McLain, 204 Ky. 404.
The plaintiff based his action on section 68 of the Kentucky Stat-
utes, which says: "Every person having, owning or keeping any dog
shall be liable to the party injured for all damages done by such dog."
A subsequent clause excepts liability where the party injured is on the
owner's premises at night or is doing some unlawful act in the day-
time.
At common law the owner of a dog was not liable for damages
inflicted on sheep or other animals in the absence of proof that the
owner had knowledge of the dog's disposition and propensity to commit
such attacks (Murray v. Young, 12 Bush 337), but section 68 has
changed that rule. Defendant, however, claims that the statute does
not aply to rabid dogs. This seems to be the view of the Michigan
court (Elliott v. Herz, 29 Mich. 202), in which decision Justice Cooley
says: "The injury from the bite of a rabid dog must be classed with
those from inevitable accident, which the law always leaves to rest
where they chance to fall, because, as no one was in fault, there is no
basis for an assessment of damages against any one." A New York
decision, Van Etten v. Yoyes, 112 N. Y. S. 888, cites this case and up-
holds this rule, but the weight of authority is that such a statute im-
poses absolute liability on the owner of the dog
The defendant is willing to assume liability for the dog when he is
in his least dangerous state, but is trying to except any liability for
him when he is in his most dangerous state. He is trying to defeat
the very purpose for which such statutes were enacted. This pur-
pose, as voiced in a decision handed down by the Massachusetts court,
In Blair v. Forehand, 100 Mass. 136, is to eradicate such evils as "sud-
den assaults upon persons . . . distressing evils from canine
madness, and other injuries occasioned by dogs."
This point has never been directly up before the Kentucky Court,
and there is no authority in point in this state, but there need be no
confusion on the question. The language of our statute is clear and
explicit. It simply states that the owner is liable for "all damage
done by such dog." In plain langauge it excepts liability in two cases
only, when the injured party is on the owner's premises at night or
when he is doing some unlawful act in the day time.
The court stated that the clarity of the statute prevented any
assumption that the condition of the dog would take it out of he
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statute, and that it could not, without invading the province of the
legislature, allow such an exception to be written into the statute.
-E. B. C.
AnEST--OFFci CANOT ARREST ON *a=UE SusrIoxox.-Defendant
was convicted for unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquors. The
facts show that a town marshal, learning that defendant had gone
to the country for some whiskey, without procuring a warrant, went
out and met defendant with the intention of arresting him. When the
officer undertook to stop the horse, it became frightened and threw de-
fendant's buggy over an embankment, causing an exposure of the
liquor, for which defendant was arrested and charged with unlawfully
transporting. Defendant appealed on the ground that an officer can-
not make an arrest on mere suspicion, without a warrant. Decision re-
versed. Catching v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 439.
The Kentucky Criminal Code, section 36, says: "A peace officer
may make an arrest without a warrant when a public offense is com-
mitted in his presence or when he has reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that the person arrested has committed a felony."
A peace officer may arrest any person whom he, upon reasonable
grounds, believes has committed a felony, although it afterwards ap-
pears that no felony was actually perpetrated. Numerous decisions
uphold this practice. Leger v. Warren, 51 L. R. A. (note) 203; Cun-
ningham v. Baker, 104 Ala. 160, 16 So. 63; Cook v. Hastings, 150 Mich.,
289, 114 N. W. 71; Grau v. Forge, 133 Ky. 521, 209 S. W. 369; Lewis v.
Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 449, 247 S. W. 749.
The case turns on the question of what are reasonable grounds for
believing that a felony has been committed In Rowland v. Common-
wealth, 202 Ky. 92, 259 S. W. 33, the court held that the officers prop-
erly seized a car without a warrant for arrest of defendant, after they
had turned a spotlight on the car, exposing to view one keg of liquor.
Also in Campbell v. Commonwealth, 203 Ky. 151, 261 S. W. 1107, the
bulkiness of women's apparel, a wet spot, and admission in inquiry
that they had liquor, was held to be reasonable grounds for arrest
without a warrant.
Forcible arrest, without warrant, on suspicion that defendant was
transporting liquor, was held unlawful in United States v. Snyder,
278 Federal 650. An arrest by an officer without a warrant is not
justified by the fact that the officer had information leading him to
believe that an offense was being committed. Hughes v. State, 145
Tenn. 544, 238 S. W. 588. A peace officer is not authorized to arrest,
on the mere authority of a telegram, a person who is not shown to be
guilty of a felony. Glazer v. Hubbard, 102 Ky. 68, 42 S. W. 1114.
When an officer has reasonable grounds for believing that a person
has committed a felony, he' may arrest without a warrant and take
possession of the unlawful things on the person arrested, but he has
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no lawful right to search on suspicion. Youman v. Commonwealth,
189 Ky. 152.
The test, relating to an officer having reasonable grounds for be-
lieving that a felony has been committed, is whether the facts or cir-
cumstances are such as would actuate a man of ordinary reason and
prudence in the officer's situation, acting in good faith in the dis-
charge of the officer's duties. Bushardt v. United Inv. Co., 121 S. C.
324, 113 S. E. 637; Grau v. Forge, 183 Ky. 521, 209 S. W. 369.
Whether an officer has reasonable grounds for telieving that a fel-
ony has been committed, so as to be entitled to make an arrest with-
out a warrant, is often a question of fact, and when the facts are mixed,
it is the duty of the court to submit the question to the jury. Common.
wealth v. Bollinger, 198 Ky. 646, 249 S. W. 786; KZlotz v. Cook, 184 Ky.
735, 212 S. W. 917; 2files v. Brown, 143 Ky. 537, 136 S. W. 1001.
In deciding the present case, the court held that an officer cannot
arrest on mere suspicion, without knowledge of facts. -W. F. S.
AursT--Crui=AL LAW-PusoNs HAVING WHn Sx iN AuTomo-
BILE PROPERLY ARRESTED Wrr o T SEARCH WARRANT-ADMIssIBrIY OF
EvIDENcE.-The sheriff was informed by telephone that a strange car,
curtained and covered with mud, was standing on a lane four miles
from town. Immediately the sheriff and a deputy went to the spot
where he found it, and on approaching it, the defendant from the in-
side opened the door exposing to the view of the sheriff kegs of liquor
and releasing the fumes of moonshine. Thereupon the officer placed the
occupants of the car under arrest. Held, arrest was proper. Ferrell
v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 548.
Now the defendant claims that the evidence obtained against him
was incompetent because he was improperly arrested without a
search warrant. In Rowland v. Commonwealth, 295 S. W. 33, this
court held that officers who arrested defendant after throwing a spot-
light on defendant's car exposing to their view kegs of liquor, were
justified in doing so without a search warrant. But in Helton v. Com,
195 Ky. 678, it was held that an officer could not, without warrant, force
defendant to uncover a quart of liquor which he was carrying wrap-
ped up in an apron. Evidence obtained by this arrest was held in-
competent as it was discovered by an illegal search. The officer did
not know what it was until after his search. In CommonweatMz v.
Warner and Honer, 198 Ky. 784, defendants raced thru town in their
car, disobeying the sheriff's order to stop, but finally had to stop on
account of a barricade erected in the road pursuant to an order of the
sheriff teleplboned ahead. When the sheriff came up he smelled
whiskey and saw several bottles lying around near the car. He saw
further that the occupants of the car were drinking and had passed
whiskey around to the bystanders. The court held that he arrested
them properly without a warrant.
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The rule laid down by these cases seems to be that when the ob-
ject of the search is in plain sight of the officer, so that any reasonable
man could have seen the liquor and smelled the fumes, then no search
warrant is necessary, and all evidence obtained by a search is compe-
tent. Here the defendant opened the door and exposed the liquor so
that the officer saw it and smelled it. He had all the evidence at a
glance. But if the defendant had not opened the door, the sheriff
would not have been justified in searching the car without a warrant.
The decision of the court that this was a legal search and that the
evidence is competent falls right in line with the hereinbefore cited
cases, and all the authority in this state. -B. B. C.
CoERCi- or W=I BY HUsBAN--No PsREU IumoN OF CoERiooN IF
WIFE COMMITTED CRIME CONJOINTLY wsrT, o IN PRESENcE OF, HusAND.
-Appellant was convicted of unlawful possession of intoxicating
liquors. The prosecuting witness stated that he stopped at appellant's
home to get a drink of whiskey. Appellant stated that she did not
have any, but as he started out of the door the appellant's husband
called him back. He then saw a half gallon jar on the table and poured
out two drinks. Appellant said the whiskey was not hers, but on cross-
examination she was asked whose whiskey it was, and said, "It was
mine." Judgment affirmed. Held, the whiskey being her property, she
was guilty of the charge, regardless of the fact that the sale was made
in the presence of her husband. Bevins v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky.
444.
It was a rule of the common law that where a crime, with some
exceptions, was committed by a married woman, conjointly with, or
in the presence of her husband, prima facie she was not criminally
liable, as it was presumed that she acted in obedience to his commands
or under his coercion. In the case of Commonwealth v. Neal, 10 Blass.
152, this rule was strictly applied, and in Commonwealth v. Burce, 11
Gray 437, it was held that a married woman cannot be punished for
a sale of intoxicating liquors, either as principal or as agent of her
husband, if he is near enough for her to be under his influence and
control, even if he is not in the same room with her. But such courts
did not hold that a wife is excused from crime when that crime was
committed in the absence of her husband. Commonwealth v. Mur.
phy, 2 Gray 510; State v. Nelson, 29 Me. 329. Still later cases have
held that the presumption of law that the wife committed an offense
by the coercion of her husband when he was present, is very slight,
and may be rebutted by very slight circumstances. State v. Cleaves,
59 Me. 298; Nolan v. Traber, 49 Md. 460; Htate v. Miller, 162 Mo. 253.
'While it is said that the reason for the common law rule is not
quite clear; it is evident that it must have had its foundation in the
peculiar relation which existed between husband and wife in the
earlier days. Such a rule is explained by the fact that the wife had
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no will of her own and her legal existence was merged into that of her
husband so that they were termed and regarded as one in law, "the
husband being that one." Courts do not now regard the fiction that
husband and wife are one because of the many individual rights that
have been given the wife. Even courts of equity at an early day had
disregarded the fiction that husband and wife were one. 'Winebrinner
v. Weisiger, 3 T. B. Monroe 32.
Kentucky has entirely disregarded the old rule by the passing of
an act on March 15, 1894, which act is now sections 2127 and 2128 of
the Kentucky Statutes. Under that act, the husband has no estate or
interest in his wife's property. Also, by virtue of that act, the wife
may make contracts, sue or be sued, collect her rent, and may sell
and dispose of her personal property. Lane v. Bryant, 100 Ky. 138, was
one of the first cases in which the court declined to follow the com-
mon law rule. In that case the husband was not liable for slanderous
words spoken by his wife, because sections 2127 and 2128 of the Ken-
tucky Statutes had given the wife a legal being, separate and apart
from that of her husband. It is conclusive that the one person idea of
husband and wife is no longer in effect. NAragel v. Tieperman, 74 Kan.
32. -A. H. T.
CnR uAL LAw-BURGLARY STATUTE HELD NOT INVAID AS IfPaOS-
nG CRUEL ANsD INHumAw PuNIsHxImmT.-Under section 1159 of the Ken-
tucky Statutes, as amended by chapter 97 of the Acts of 1922, the ap-
pellant was convicted of burglary and his punishment fixed at death.
Conviction sustained. Gibson v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 748.
This section is as follows: "Every person guilty of burglary shall
be punished with death, or confinement in the penitentiary for life,
in the discretion of the jury." Appellant insists that the law under
which he was convicted and his punishment fixed is unconstitutional
because it violates Article 8 of the Federal Constitution; and he fur-
ther insists that it is unconstitutional because it violates section 17
of the Constitution of Kentucky, which is as follows: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punish-
ment inflicted."
The appellant cannot avail himself of Article 8 of the Federal
Constitution. This applies only to acts of Congress and the federal
courts, Barker v. People, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 686, and does not apply to
the states. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323.
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death. What punishment is suited to a specified offense must in gen-
eral be determined by the legislature. At the time of Blackstone one
hundred and sixty actions had been declared by acts of Parliament
to be felonies without benefit of clergy, and, therefore, punishable with
instant death. 4 B1. 18. All persons guilty of larceny above the value
of twelve pence were directed to be hanged. 4 BI. 237.
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In the case of Cornelison v. Commonwealth, 34 Ky. 583, a fine of one
cent and imprisonment for three years for an assault with a cane and
a cowhide was not cruel or excessive punishment; nor sentence for a
term not exceeding that prescribed by statute was not regarded as
cruel nor unusual punishment. Jackson v. U. S., 102 Fed. 473; nor a
verdict of thirty years' imprisonment was not cruel or unusual pun-
ishment where -the Code provided that the punishment for burglary of
a private residence should be imprisonment in the penitentiary for any
term not less than five years. Handy v. State, 80 S. W. 526 (Tem.).
The court said in Whitten v. State, 47 Ga. 297: "It would be an
interference with matters left by the Constitution to the legislative
department of government for us to undertake to weigh the propriety
of this or that penalty fixed by the legislature for specific offenses. So
long as they do not provide cruel and unusual punishment, such as
disgraced the civilization of former ages, and make one shudder with
horror to read of them, as drawing, quartering, burning, etc., the Con-
stitution does not put any limit upon legislative discretion."
Burglary is a heinous offense. There is always a possibility that
homicide will be the culmination. The sanctity of the home is violated
by the intruder. Legislatures and courts guard the home with jeal-
ousy equal to that of the trial by jury. The statute was properly sus-
tained. -H. H. G.
DESCENT AND DisrnIsuTRIol-ADvANlcmM T TO CBMn--Intestate
left two sons who qualified as administrators. They filed their final set-
tlement with the county judge showing that they had distributed the
estate equally among the distributees, without any consideration of
advancements. This suit was brought by the heir of a daughter of
the deceased, seeking to surcharge the settlement of the administrators,
claiming that each of the other children had received large advance-
ments which should have been charged to them, and that before they
received anything further out of the personalty the other distributees
should have been made equal to them.
The court held that an advancement to a child does not constitute
a debt to the parent and if the advancement is more than the child's
part of the estate he cannot be required to bring the excess into a
hotchpot, but if advancements, varying in size, have been made to chil-
dren, those receiving less are entitled to be made equal before any
further distribution of the estate is made. Edwards v. Livesay, 203
Ky. 53.
If a parent allows a child a certain sum for education or neces-
saries, it is not considered an advancement; but where lands were
deeded to sons as gifts they were treated as advancements to them
by their father who later died intestate. Nichols v. King, 24 K. L. IL
124, 68 S. W. 133. A son, having collected a sum due his father, was
directed by him to use it in building a house on the son's property.
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This was regarded as an advancement. Blackerby v. Holton, 35 Ky.
520.
if money is given as an advancement, it cannot afterwards be
made a debt. Bobbett v. Barlow, 26 Ky. L. R. 1076, 83 S. W. 145. After
settlement of the estate it was discovered that one of the heirs had re-
ceived advancements in excess of the others. It was held that the
excess did not constitute a debt from the heirs to his co-heirs and co-
distributees. Eckler v. Galbraith, 12 Bush 71; Farley v. Stacey, 177
Ky. 109, 197 S. W. 636.
Some states follow the hotchpot rule, that is, a child who re-
ceives an advancement has, at the donor's death intestate, to elect
whether he will keep the property and relinquish his distributive share
in the donor's estate, or will account to the other distributees for the
value of the property and receive his distributive portion. He cannot
be required to pay back to the estate any part of the advancement, and
if he has received an equal share or more than his share, he can only
be excluded from participation in the distribution of the estate. Mc-
Coy v. McCoy, 105 Va. 829, 54 S. W. 995; Wilson v. Wilson, 18 Ala. 176.
An early Kentucky case, in 1833, held that advancements in land or
slaves or both should be brought into hotchpot in division of either or
both. Stone's Administrator v. Halley, 31 Ky. 197. But, in 1893, a
atatute was enacted providing that any personal or real estate or
money given by a parent or grandparent to descendant shall be charged
to the descendant in the distribution of the undevised estate of the
parent; such party shall receive nothing further therefrom until other
descendants are made equal with him. Kentucky Statutes, 1407.
Where a father gives to one of his children by deed or will cer-
tain property, declaring in the instrument that it is all he intends that
child to have of his estate, he does not exclude that child from parti-
cipation in his undevised estate; the child will be charged with what
he has received as advancement and when equalized will receive part
of the undevised estate. Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Ky. 498; Duff v.
Duff, 146 Ky. 201. Three devisees were to receive equal shares in the
estate of testator; it was found that the son had received $506 more
than his third; he was required to execute a note for that amount to
his mother who had received that much less than her third. Montgom-
ery's Trustees v. Brown, 134 Ky. 592.
The hotchpot rule applies to cases of intestacy only, but there are
no decisions handed down in Kentucky directly in point. However,
the cases cited above dealing with partial intestacy tend to show that
children who have received advancements are required to account for
the amount received before they may come in for a division of the
undevised estate. -B. K. M.
HOmxcrm--RiGHT TO K. iN DErENDING AGAINST ROBBERY DOES
NOT END AS SOON As TER is SCHANGE OF POSSESSION OF PROPERTY-
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ROBBmY, WAMNTING KILLING, NEED NOT BE TA=G PROPERTY Dt-
RECTY Fnom THE PRsoN -The deceased, knowing the appellant had a
large sum of money in his trunk, went to the appellant's room to ask
for change. While the appellant was making change, the deceased
seized the appellant by the throat, took the money from the trunk, and
left the room, followed by the appellant, who called for help. Appel-
lant secured a pistol, demanded the money, whereupon the deceasd
struck him, and the appellant shot. The lower court donvicted him
of manslaughter. Reversed. Flynn v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 572.
"If a man attempts to set fire to my dwelling house by surprise,
and I can only prevent it by killing him, I may do so; but the reason
is because I may and must prevent the felony, and not because if I do
not kill him I will lose my property." Clark, Criminal Law, section 65.
Homicide in protection of property, where there is no element of
personal danger is not excusable, since the law does not impose the
death penalty for any crime affecting property only. Pierce v. Common-
wealth, 115 S. E. 686. In a recent Georgia case it was held that an
owner may pursue a robber who has taken his -property and may use
such force as is necessary to recover the property, but he could not
shoot in revenge. Drew v. State, 136 Ga. 658, 71 S. E. 1108. There are
a number of Kentucky cases holding with this case. The owner has no
right to shoot to prevent taking away of property unless he has been
put in fear of bodily harm to himself or another. Grigsby v. Common-
wealth, 151 Ky. 496, 152 S. W. 580; Stacey v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky.
402, 225 S. W. 37; Chapman v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. Law Rep. 704,
15 S. W. 50.
The upper court based its decision on the earlier Georgia case,
which holds that the right of an owner to kill the robber extends to
the prevention of his carrying off the property which he has thus got-
ten from the owner. Crawford v. State, 90 Ga. 701, 17 S. E1. 628. One
giving chase to another who has stolen his money is justified in trying
to recover his money and may go to the extent of shooting the person
who has taken it. Johnson v. State (Texas), 218 S. W. 496.
To constitute robbery it is not necessary that the taking shall be
directly from the person of the owner, but it is sufficient if done in his
presence, against his will, by violence or putting him in fear, Craw-
ford v. State, 90 Ga. 701, 17 S. E. 628.
The upper court follows these decisions and lays down an entirely
new rule for Kentucky. The right to kill in defending against robbery
does not end as soon as -there is such a change of possession of prop-
erty as will render the crime technically complete, but remains with
the owner as long as his property is in his immediate presence, and
the killing of the robber will prevent it from being carried away.
To constitute robbery, to prevent which killing may be justified, it
is not necessary that the taking of the property shall be directly from
one's person; it is sufficient if it is taken while in his possession and
immediate presence. -B. K. MW.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE-CONTRACT BY WIFE ALONE TO SELL HER LAND
UNENFORcEAELPr THOUGH DIVORCE OBTA-NED BEFORE TiM FOR PERFORM-
ANcE.-Plaintiff was a married woman who owned a farm. She was
not living with her husband. On March 1, 1923, plaintiff contracted in
writing to sell said farm to defendant, one provision being that if
plaintiff was not able to convey said farm to defendant within twelve
months, the defendant might treat the contract as one of rental.
January 19, 1924, a divorce was granted to the husband of plaintiff.
Being thus freed of her disability as a married woman, plaintiff ten-
dered the deed to said land to defendant within the twelve months,
though defendant had notified plaintiff in writing prior to the decree
of divorce that he would not take the land and elected to treat the
contract as one of rental only. Plaintiff brought suit for specific per-
formance after the divorce had been handed down. A contract to sell
her land by a married woman without her husband joining was void
and unenforceable, though she obtained a divorce before date of per-
formance, and she could 'not obtain specific performance, in view of
Kentucky Statutes, sections 506, 2128, there being no mutuality.
Brown v. Allen, 204 Ky. 76.
Among states having statutes on this point similar to the Ken-
tucky Statutes, sections 506, 2128, there is a difference of opinion as
to the validity of a married woman's power to make a binding execu-
tory agreement to sell her land without her husband joining. Under
Rev. St. 1911, section 6864, giving a married woman power to contract
with regard to her property, a married woman's contract to convey
land is not void for want of power, though her husband is still re-
quired to join her in the deed. Davis v. Watson, 89 Mo. App. 15. A
married woman, if living separate and apart from her husband, may
sell and convey her real estate without her husband's joining in the
contract or conveyance. Radford v. Carlisle, 13 W. Va. 572. A written
contract by a married woman for the sale of her land, unless living
separate and apart from her husband, cannot be specifically enforced
unless acknowledged and joined by her husband. Rosenour v. Rosen-
our, 47 W. Va. 554. Under Burns' Rev. St., 1901, section 6961, a mar-
ried woman has no power to encumber and convey her lands, except by
deed in which her husband joins. Her individual contract to sell and to
execute a bond for a deed is void and furnishes no consideration for
notes for the purchase money. Shirl v. Stafford, 31 Ind. App. 246.
A contract of a married woman to sell her land is an executory con-
tract, which is void, unless her husband joins in it, a part of its execu-
tion involving the making of a conveyance and the deed not being
executed. As a contract for the sale of real property is required by
Burns' Ann. St. 1908, section 7462, subd. 4, to be in writing the join-
ing of the husband of a married-woman in her executory contract to
sell her real estate, necessary, under section 7853, to its validity, re-
quires his signing it. Knepper v. Eggiman, 177 Ind. 56. Under Rev.
St., 1911, section 1114, a married woman is held to have no authority
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to contract to convey her separate real estate, so that her contract
would not be specifically enforced. Blakely v. Kanaman, 107 Tex. 206.
Kentucky follows .the rule upheld by the majority and supported
by the better reasoning. A deed of a married woman is invalid where
her husband fails to unite with her or where he has not previously
made a separate conveyance of his interest to the purchaser. Syck v.
Eellier, 140 Ky. 388; Bohannon v. Travis, 94 Ky. 59; Mueller v. Rags-
dale, 158 Ky. 142. It is provided in sections 505-507, Kentucky Stat-
utes, how a married woman may convey her real estate, and it has
been written by this court in a number of cases following these stat-
utes that the conveyance by a married woman of her real estate,
unless her husband is a party to the conveyance or has not theretofore
conveyed, is void as to the wife. Where a married woman, by a con-
tract to which her husband is not a party, sells trees growing on her
land, the contract is not binding on her unless it contemplates the im-
mediate severance of the trees from the ground. Where it appears
that the trees were not to be cut from the land immediately, a written
contract by which the wife sells the trees growing on her land, will
not be binding on her unless it is executed in the manner provided in
sections 505 and 506 of Kentucky Statutes, providing how a married
woman may convey her real estate. Farmers' Bank¢ v. Richardson,
171 Ky. 340, 142 S. W. 608. Since, at the time of the making of the
contract which plaintiff now seeks to enforce, she was disqualified by
statute to enter into an executory contract for the sale of her lands
and was not bound thereby, it follows that the party with whom she
contracted was not bound, for it is elementary that if one party is not
bound, neither is bound. -L. C.
INJUN OTIoN-CONTEMIPT--PROCEEDINGS FOR VIOLATION OF INJUNC-
TION UNDER CLAYTON AcT.-The petitioners were striking employes of
the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Company, and
were preceeded against by bill in equity for combining and conspiring
to interfere with interstate commerce. After a hearing a preliminary
injunction was granted. Subsequently the railway company instituted
proceedings charging the petitioners with sundry violations of the in-
junction. Under section 22 of the Clayton Act, the petitioners ap-
plied for a jury trial, but the District Court denied the application and
proceeded without a jury.
Section 22 of the Clayton Act provides that the "trial may be by
the court, or upon demand of the accused by a jury." The question
presented is whether Congress may require a trial by jury upon the
demand of the accused in an independent proceeding at law for a crim-
inal contempt. Such a requirement was held valid. Michaelson, et aL
v. U. S., ex rel. 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18.
Contempt proceedings have their origin in the common law. "Con-
tempt has relation solely to an offense against the court itself, its dig-
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nity and authority." Drody v. District Court of Polk County, 102 N.
W. (Ia.) 115.
The power to punish for contempt exists in all courts indepen-
dently of the statute, Clark v. People, 12 Am. Dec. 177; Shiff v. State,
2 Iowa 350, except inferior courts that have no power to punish for
contempt save that granted by statute. State v. Galloway, 5 Cold.
(Tenn.) 326; Rutherford v. Holmes, 66 N. Y. 368. The power to pun-
Ish for contempt may be limited or regulated by statute. People v.
Wilson, 64 Ill. 195. From these and a large number of other decisions
it can be seen with little difficulty that in the absence of statute con-
tempt proceedings are governed by the court; that the legislature or
Congress may grant power to inferior courts to punish for contempt;
or that they may limit the power of superior as well as inferior courts
in this matter.
Another important point of contention in the case under considera-
tion relates to the construction to be placed on the words "the trial
may be by the court, or upon the demand of the accused, by a jury."
Is this merely permissive or is it mandatory? In Supervisors v. U.
S., 4 Wall 435, where a statute provided that the board of supervisors
"may, if deemed advisable, levy a special tax," for a payment of a fine
against the county, the court ruled that though this was permissive
in form, it was in fact mandatory and further said, "In all cases it
is held that the intent of the legislature, which is the test, was not to
devolve a mere direction, but to impose a positive and absolute duty."
In Rex v. Regina, 2 Salk. 609, the court said, "When d statute directs
the doing of a thing for the sake of justice or the public good the word
'may' is the same as the word 'shall.' -H. H. G.
INSANE PEzsoN-ADJuDxcATIo OF INsANITY ONLY PEmrA FACin
EVIDENCE OF THAT CONDITION AT SUBSEQUMINT Tnt&-On June 6, 1919,
F. was judicially declared insane. He was confined in an asylum for
two months and then released as of sound mind by the superintendent
of the asylum. F. has been in active management of his affairs since
that time. On August 4, 1921, he executed a mortgage deed of his
property to W, the latter agreeing to reconvey the property to F. if
a debt of $1,000.00 were paid by January 1, 1922. On October 4, 1921
F. was judicially declared of sound mind. W. seeks to enforce the deed
on F.'s failure to pay the debt F. defends on the ground that the deed
was invalid because of its being executed at a time when he was in-
sane. Defense held insufficient. Fugate v. Walker, 204 Ky. 768.
The question in this case is whether by the adjudication of F. as
Insane the court, on the evidence presented, could have found him in-
sane at the time of the making of the deed.
Generally, an adjudication of insanity is almissible as evidence
at a later time, although not conclusive. Ordinarily it substitutes for
the general presumption of sanity, a presumption of insanity, and ac-
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cordingly the party's subsequent civil acts are prima facie invalid.
This presumption is rebuttable at common law and the strength Gf such
presumption is lessened in proportion to the remoteness of the adjudi-
cation. Hale v. Harris, 134 N. W. (Mich.) 1111; Huffaker v. Brammer,
193 Ky. 267; Clark v. Trail, 1 Mete. 35.
In some states, by force of statute, the finding of insanity is con-
clu~ive as to the existence of insanity during the continuance of the
adjudication. CockriZZ v. Cockrill, 79 Fed. (Mo.) 143; Carter v. Beck-
with, 28 N. E. (N. Y.) 582; Knox v. Haug, 50 N. W. (Minn.) 934.
Kentucky follows the general rule, the courts of this state holding
that prior adjudication of insanity is only prima facie evidence of that
condition existing at the time of the execution of a subsequent con-
veyance. Rath v. Smith, 180 Ky. 326; Wathen v. Skaggs, 161 Ky. 600;
Johnson v. Mitchell, 146 Ky. 382.
In the present case the evidence as to the insanity of F. was only
prima facie, and from the facts that were produced to rebut the pre-
sumption of insanity the court properly reached the conclusion that
F.'s defense was unsupportable. The facts show that F. was confined
in the asylum for only two months; that he transacted business for
a long time afterwards and was adjudicated sane a short time after
the deed in question was executed. Facts of similar nature have been
held sufficient to rebut a presumption of insanity. Miler v. Rutledge,
82 Va. 863, 1 S. E. 202; Jones v. Schaffner, 188 N. W. (Ia.) 787; Eagle
v. Peterson, 206 S. W. (Ark.) 55; Witty v. State, 153 S. W. (Tex.) 1146
-M. F.
MASTER AND SERvAT-CounRT MAY RIEVEw DEcISIox OF SINGLE
MEMBER OF ComPESATIox BoARD.-While in the employment of appel-
lant company appellee was injured. He had not yet accepted the provis-
ions of the compensation act, under which the company was operating,
but later signed his agreement thereto and was paid a weekly sum
by the company's insurance carrier for nine months, when it discon-
tinued such payments. Appellee then filed claim for compensation
with the compensation board. Upon hearing before a single member
of the board, his application was denied, solely because appellee had
not aceepted the provisions of the act at the time of the injury. With-
in twenty days he filed his action in the circuit court for review of the
board's order, and the court set aside the order and allowed the claim.
Appellant contends that there can be no appeal to the courts for a
review of the award, unless within seven days thereafter application
is made for review by the entire board. The decision of the circuit
court was affirmed. Junior Oil Co. v. Byrd, 204 Ky. 375.
Up to the present time there appears to have been no case decided
in Kentucky which involved the question whether an employe working
under the compensation act is required to ask for a review by the
full board after his claim for compensation has been heard by a single
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member of the board, before he can appeal to the court for review
of the award. Failure of such a case to have arisen in this state is
due probably to two reasons: (1) An employe, after having received
an award by one member of the board will, in the ordinary case, ask
for a rehearing by the full board; (2) the provision in the Workmen's
Compensation Act of Kentucky regarding rehearing by the board
before an appeal to court is permissible, differs from that of other
states In that by provisions of other jurisdictions such procedure is
compulsory, while in Kentucky the statute is so worded as not to make
a review by the board of its award necessary before there can be an
appeal. .lemer v. District Court, 155 N. W. 1057; Union Sanitary Mfg.
Co. v. Davis, 3.14 N. E. S72. The case of Carro7l v. Industrial Commnis-
sion, 69 Colo. 473, 195 Pac. 1:097, clearly indicates that by provision of
the Colorado act, rehearing by the board is necessary before review
by the court. That case decided that "under a provision there shall
be a rehearing by the commission before a review by the court where,
after-the first petition, the oider denying compensation was opened and
further taken, after which another adverse holding was entered."
An observation of the statutes of this state, however, indicates
plainly that Kentucky does not follow the rule that obtains in other
jurisdictions regarding appeal to the court of an award by the board.
Section 4933, Kentucky Statutes, provides that an application may
be heard and determined by the board or any of its members.
Section 4934 provides: "If an application for review is made to the
board within seven days from the date of the award, the full board, if
the first hearing was not held before the full board, shall review the
evidence, or, if deemed advisable, as soon as practicable, hear the
parties at issue," etc.
Section 4935 provides: "An award or order of the board as pro-
vided in section 4933, if application for review be not filed as therein
provided, or an order or award of the board upon review as provided
in section 4934, shall be binding . . . as to all questions of fact,
but either party may, within twenty days after the rendition of such
award, . ... by petition appeal to the circuit court that would
have jurisdiction," etc.
In none of these sections is there an express provision or intima-
tion that a rehearing by the board is necessary before there can be a
review of the award by the court. On the contrary, section 4933
plainly declares that there can be a hearing of the application by the
board or any of its members; and section 4935 recognizes an award
or order made under either sections 4933 or 4934, the latter being the
provision regarding rehearing by the full board.
The Court of Appeals correctly construed the provisions of the
Kentucky Statutes by determining, in the case at hand, that the review
by the full board was unnecessary for appeal to the court. -MN. F.
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TinE OF ESSENCE OF Om, LAsE--AcTioN To QuIn TrrL To LAND.-
On February 15, 1923, plaintiff obtained from one Bryant an oil and
gas lease on eighty-two and one-half acres of land in Warren county,
the lease providing that a well should be commenced by April 16, 1923,
and the lease should terminate unless the lessee should pay the lessor
the sum of eighty-two dollars for every three months the commencement
of a well was delayed. Plaintiff contracted with Lafferty, a well
driller, to drill a well on the land. Lafferty installed his drilling ap-
paratus and drilled a hole to a depth of six feet. This operation is
known as a "spud in." No further progress in the drilling of the well
can be made until casings are furnished. At this time plaintiff was
called out of town and did not return for six months, and during this
Interval paid no rentals to the lessor, who thereupon executed another
lease to defendant. Counsel for plaintiff contend that the provision
as to a commencement of a well had been complied with by the digging
of the !spud in." Judgment for defendant. Flanigan v. Stern, 204 Ky.
814.
In ordinary contracts the rule is well established that courts of
equity as a general rule do not regard time of the essence of the con-
tract. Vance v. Newman, 72 Arkansas 359; Falls v. Carlienter, 21
North Carolina 237; Tyler v. Onzts, 93 Kentucky 331. These cases show
that courts of equity abhor all forfeitures and will not enforce them
unless necessary to carry out the intention of the parties. On the
other hand, it is generally the law both in the United States and in
England that time can be made of the essence of the contract by the
stipulation of the parties, and such a provision will be enforced even
by the equity courts unless there is. conduct amounting to a waiver.
Jones v. Robbins, 29 Maine 351; Sowles v. Hall, 62 Vt. 247; Falls v.
Carpenter, 21 N. C. 237. In this situation the parties have by express
stipulation made time an essential part of their agreement and should
the courts fail to give effect to such a provision it would amount to a
judicial execution of a contract for the parties. But in oil and gas
leases, owing to the nature of these minerals, the courts generally
construe the lease in the light most favorable to the lessor, and prac-
tically all courts hold that in these leases time is of the essence of the
contract, and that it is the duty of the lessee to begin his operations
within the time specified in the lease and to promote it with reasonable
diligence. Thornton on Oil and Gas 23; Edwards v. rola Oil & Gas
Company, 65 Kansas 362; American Window Glass Go. v. Williams, 30
Indiana 685; Bell v. Hilburn, 192 Ky. 809; Jenkins v. Williams, 191
Ky. 165; Niles v. Meade, 189 Ky. 243. The object of the rule is to pro-
mote development and prevent delay and unproductiveness, and this is
regarded as the real intent of the lessor even if there are no express
words of forfeiture. An opposite holding would deprive the lessor of
valuable royalties and grant to the lessee the use of land at a mere
nominal rental. -J. H.
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WILLS-TEST iN DETzn VIm G 1'TESTAETARY CAPAcrIY."-By his
will testator, a physician, devised property to relatives, friends and
charities. He was nearly eighty years old when he made the will and
died two years later. His only child contested the will on the ground
of mental incapacity, relying on the following facts to show such in-
capacity: Testator's belief that the negro was a soulless brute; that
the Catholic church would destroy the republic; that all tobacco pool-
ers should receive the same price for their tobacco; that the germ
theory of disease was false; and the fact that testator's resorting to
osteopathy the last two years of his life, although he was a general
practitioner. Testator was of high temper, strong prejudices, and
had an inclination to debate. All the witnesses, however, admited that
fie was a good business man, knew what property he had and under-
stood how -to make trades. The court upheld a peremptory instruction
that the will be sustained, deciding that such evidence was irrelevant
to show testamentary capacity. Newman v. Dixon Bank & Trust Co.,
Exor., et al., 205 Ky. 31.
The test in determining "testamentary capacity," while being
dlscusesd and defined by the authorities in varied language, is in
effect the same in the numerous jurisdictions and has been well ex-
pressed by Gardner in his treatise on "Wills," p. 87, as follows: "A
testator has a sound mind for testamentary purposes only when he
can understand and carry in mind, in a general way, the nature and
situation of his property and his relations to the persons around him.
He must understand the act which he is doing, the disposition
which he wishes to make of his property, and the relation in which
he stands to the objects of his bounty and to those who ought to be
In his mind on the occasion of making his will." This rule for deter-
mining capacity obtanis in Kentucky. Newcomb's EaTor. v. Newcomb,
96 Ky. 120; King v. King (Ky.) 42 S. W. 347; Dunaway v. Smoot (Ky.)
67 S. W. 62.
in the case under consideration testator's eccentricities denote
racial and religious projudices and personal opinions on the theory
of medicine, all guided by a high temper and a turn for argument.
Such peculiarities have been declared by the settled weight of the
law to be insufficient evidence to invalidate a will unless it is shown
that these singularities have had something to do with the disposition
of testator's property. Gardner on Wills, p. 100: "Perverse opinions
and unreasonable prejudices do not constitute moral depravity." 33
N. Y. 619 4 Grat. (Va.) 106; Turner v. Hand, Fed, Cas. No. 14,257 (3
Wall. Jr. 88); Williams' E or. v. Williams, 23 S. W. 789, 15 Ky. L. R.
432.
There was nothing in the will as drawn up by the present testa-
tor to indicate that his opinions and prejudices had influenced him in
the making of his testamentary paper In fact, his will was commended
by the court as comparing favorably in point of clearness with the
average will prepared by members of the legal profession,
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Furtheimore, even though these opinions would have played a
part in the provisions made in the will by the testator, the court would
not appear to err in declaring the instrument valid, for opinions on
racial, religious and medical questions are almost universally, if not
entirely, indulged in by thd people of today. Although the testator
could not have been commended for indulging in such prejudices and
thereby aligning himself with the great masses who still persist in
assailing the bidding that each should love his fellow-man, he must
be considered as one element in a world which is still far from that
point when racial and religious prejudice will be so condemned that
but to exercise such will be deemed a violation ol sound mental action.
The court was correct both as to principle and authority in ad-
mitting the will. 69 Ga. 82; 10 S. W. (Ky.) 373. -IM. F.
